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Abstract.  This article updates a previous IBPP analysis on the significance of whether Saddam Hussein is 
alive or dead. 
 
The May 6, 2003 Issue of IBPP contained an article, “The Life and Death of Saddam and Osama,” that 
addressed the question of Saddam Hussein’s and Osama bin Laden’s ultimate fate.  Did it matter if 
Saddam was alive or dead?  At the time the answer was no. 
 
If Saddam were alive, his power as head of a national government would still be gone.  If Saddam were 
alive, he still would have no functional location—inside or outside the Iraq—to make a political and 
military comeback.  If Saddam were alive, such a fate for such a malignant narcissist might even be 
worse than death. 
 
If Saddam were dead, his fate could be employed by the United States Government (USG) and its 
compliant allies as a warning to other dictators, terrorists, and reified malcontents who defy the script 
for the Good and Just.  And whether alive or dead, Saddam could be useful to the most divergent of 
political actors.  Terrorists, humanitarian organizations, and national governments—even if such entities 
could be rigidly and validly differentiated—could and would take the image of an alive or dead Saddam 
and construct a discourse serving respective political needs. 
 
However, several events have occurred since the writing of the May 6th article that merit qualifying its 
analysis.  First, the mass media narrative of the US President declaring an end to hostilities followed by 
continued hostilities serves as a kernel of fact around, from, and onto which fantasies, dreams, fears, 
and willful agendas can be overlaid, grown, and projected.  Second, the mass media narrative continues 
to be reinforced of the US President claiming that Saddam will be found dead or alive even as the latter 
has not been found or (for Saddam fans) continues not to be found.  The third event, the coup de grace, 
comprises statements by US military officers and USG civilian representatives that the fate of Saddam 
Hussein does matter after initial statements that it didn’t.  Fourth, US representatives asserting the 
import of Saddam Hussein’s fate are attributing this import to his being possibly alive as a source of 
inspiration for Baathists who are behind the continued hostilities—even as one can make a strong case 
that the hostilities have much less to do with this than with many political, economic, social, and cultural 
segments of the Iraqi population attempting to take advantage of the situation for their respective 
needs. 
 
Saddam Hussein—alive or dead—didn’t and shouldn’t matter any more.  But it does now.  (See 
Hoshmand, L.T.  (2003). Can lessons of history and logical analysis ensure progress in psychological 
science? Theory & Psychology, 13, 39-44; Neuman, Y., & Levi, M.  (2003). Blood and chocolate: A 
rhetorical approach to fear appeal. Journal of Language & Social Psychology, 22, 29-46; Schildkraut, D. J.  
(2002). The more things change...American identity and mass and elite responses to 9/11. Political 
Psychology, 23, 511-535; Schmitt, E.  (June 26, 2003).  Further attacks on allies predicted by U.S. general.  
The New York Times, p. A14; The life and death of Saddam and Osama.  (May 6, 2003).  IBPP, 14(15); 
1
: The Life and Death of Saddam Redux
Published by Scholarly Commons, 2003
International Bulletin of Political Psychology 
2 
 
Winfield, B.M.  (2003). Turning the kaleidoscope: Telling stories in rhetorical spaces. Journal of Sociology 
& Social Welfare, 3023-40.) 
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